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not a free lunch for the acceding countries either. In this paper we analyse 
how the restructuring process of the CEE's economies that started with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and that is made even more urgent by their 
willingness to acquire the full membership of the European Union affect 
these countries. We also show that EU membership can, paradoxically, 
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economic policy instruments. 
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1. Introduction 
On the first of May 2004 the European Union (EU) has undergone 
one of the most important steps since its creation: the Eastern European 
enlargement. Eight previous planned economy countries plus Cyprus and 
Malta have entered the EU and more are expected to join in the immediate 
future1. There has been a lot of debate on the consequences of this 
enlargement for both the incumbent countries as well as the acceding ones. 
Some of the worries of the previous group of countries is that by admitting 
countries very much behind (under the economic point of view) even with 
respect to the poorest EU member, the economic resources that were before 
divided among the 15 member countries will be almost completely drained 
by the new entrants2. Other concerns about the enlargement are the effects it 
will have in the immediate future on the labour markets of the incumbent 
                                                 
♦ Department of Public Economics. University of Rome “La Sapienza”. The author would 
like to thank Maurizio Franzini, Giancarlo Gandolfo, Augusto Graziani and two 
anonymous referees for comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. 
1The eight countries are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. By the year 2007 also Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join. 
2Here we are referring mainly to the Structural and Cohesion funds that are distributed on 
the basis of the ratio of a country GDP to the average EU-GDP. 
  
 
 
 
countries and on the budget of the Union itself3. Entering an economic and 
monetary union also involves costs and not just benefits for the acceding 
countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to build a theoretical model in order to 
analyze the effects that the respect of the obligations necessary for acquiring 
membership of an economic and monetary union might have on the 
economy of new entrants. While the model is general and may apply to any 
emerging country entering a monetary union, we use it model to analyze 
how respecting the Maastricht Treaty constraints and the Stability Pact can 
influence the transition speed of the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) that have just joined the EU and of those that will join in the near 
future. Those all are expected to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
some day. 
We build a dynamic disequilibrium model in which the level of 
activity is demand driven and to reduce unemployment, policy authorities 
have to stimulate consumption and investment. Moreover, in order to stress 
the transition characteristic of the acceding country, in our model the 
demand for labour depends, among other variables, on the degree of 
restructurization reached in the production sector, proxied by the amount of 
                                                 
3In as much as the labour market of the incumbent countries is concerned see F. Abraham 
and J. Konings, 1999; T. Boeri and H.Brucker, 2000, B.J. Heijdra, C. Keuschnigg and W. 
Kohler, 2002. Among the few studies that analyse the implication of the accession on East 
European labour markets see T. Boeri, M. Burda and S. Kollo, 1998. 
For general macroeconomic effects and particularly on the role of monetary and exchange 
rate strategies during the accession phase, see Merlvede B., J. Plasmans, A. Bas Van, 2003. 
For the Budget effect see European Commission 1997, 2001; Baldwin et al. 1997; Gabrish 
H. 1997. 
  
 
 
 
capital accumulated in the economy4. At the beginning of the transition 
period unemployment rise quickly due to the dismantling of the obsolete 
state owned enterprises. In a successive period, when the reconstruction of 
the productive system starts again, the job destruction process slows down 
and new jobs are created. The amount of jobs that are possible to create 
depends, among other things, on the productive capital existent in the 
economy. We show that, while the accumulation process can be increased 
both by direct state investment in infrastructure and by higher transfers from 
the government to the entrepreneurs through Active Labour Market Policies 
and the consumption expenditure can be stimulated by increasing the 
Unemployment Benefits and/or reducing the tax rate, the use of these 
policies is limited by the need for respecting the accession criteria5. So, in 
order to become an EU member these countries suffer a forced slow down 
in the transition process. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the 
analytical model and explain the economic theory that supports each 
mathematical relation. In the third section, the results of a numerical 
simulation are discussed and an equilibrium analysis together with a 
comparative dynamic analysis is carried out. Finally, we analyze the results 
                                                 
4For capital we refer here not only to industrial machineries, but also to infrastructures 
(transport facilities, telecoms, and so on). Both types of capital are deficient in the 
transition countries. In almost all CEEC's economies the industrial sector can be compared 
to the industrial sector in developing countries: while in the latter the capital is insufficient, 
in the former the capital is mostly obsolete with the exception of some countries like 
Hungary, Slovenia and Poland, where the starting situation was already better and the 
transition speed has been faster. 
5In the case of the European Union, these are the Adhesion Criteria that have been adopted 
by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1997. They also include the Maastricht Criteria 
among which are the respect of limits of the deficit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios respectively 
  
 
 
 
and draw the conclusions. In order not to make the reading of the paper too 
heavy, the derivation of the steady state and the linearization process are 
presented in the appendix. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. The theory 
The idea behind the model is that, on average, in central and eastern 
European countries the growth process is demand driven, but at the same 
time, the growth is constrained by the limited existence of infrastructure and 
advanced technologies. In other words, the low level of the aggregate 
demand does not stimulate the economic system enough in order to reduce 
unemployment. Additionally, the industrial sector is too small and 
technically obsolete. A situation like this requires large quantities of private 
as well as public investment. But, the amounts of resources that CEEC’s 
governments have are limited and, contemporaneously, there is the need to 
reduce the public debt and/or contain the public sector deficit. In such a 
situation the share of public in total investment is very small. The policy 
authorities have then to choose how to divide the public expenditure 
between the welfare system (i.e. unemployment benefits and active labour 
market policies) and investment in infrastructure, new capital and 
technologies. 
We present a stylized picture of a small open economy that 
maintains its main economic relations with the Union. Because the amount 
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of trade that is realized with the rest of the world is negligible, we do not 
pay attention to it in the model and we treat the world as if it was made up 
of only that country and the Union. 
The efforts towards European Monetary Union membership are 
modelled by adopting a fixed exchange rate regime and choosing as the 
internal interest rate that fixed by the Union Central Bank6. Also, the small 
amount of public expenditure coupled with high income tax parameter, is 
due to the need to respect of the stability and growth pact which are part of 
the adhesion criteria. 
 
2.2. The analytical structure 
The model is based on a simultaneous system of non-linear 
differential equations, the solution of which gives us the equilibrium growth 
path of the endogenous variables (consumption, investment, exports, 
imports, income, prices, wages, employment, capital). We first present the 
mathematical relations and afterwards illustrate their meaning. 
Consumption  
                                                 
6In reality, the new entrant countries do not need to fix their exchange rate to the Euro from 
the outset. However, they are expected to do so whenever they will meet the Maastricht 
Criteria (see footnote 5). They do not have the so called opting out choice like Great Britain 
and Denmark. So, for these countries joining the economic union means automatically 
having to respect the EMU criteria. At the current moment they can be members of the 
ERM II, with a fluctuation band up to  ±15%. Already Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic have declared that they will adopt the euro in the near future and 
have linked their currencies to the Euro. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1
Ct
dCt
dt
 c1 log

C t
Ct ,
  
 (1) 
where  

C t  1 WtPt Lt1  2 
1
UBttLFt2 PRt1  2 3 ,  
 
(2) 
Investment  
1
Inv pt
dInv pt
dt
 c2 log

Inv p t
Inv pt ,
 
(3) 
where  

Inv p t  3e5ite6D logYtALMPt7 ;  
(4) 
Exports  
1
Xt
dXt
dt
 c3 log

X t
Xt ,
 
(5) 
where  

X t  4Yf 8 PtPftS
9
;
 
(6) 
Imports  
1
Mt
dMt
dt
 c4 log

M t
Mt
 
(7) 
where  
  
 
 
 

M t  5Yt10 PtPftS
11
;
 
(8) 
 
 
Public Expenditure  
Gt  Inv gt  ALMPt  UBttLFt,  
(9) 
where the  t   is the unemployment rate defined as  
t  LFt  LtLFt ,  
(10) 
Unemployment Benefit  
UBt  10 WtPt ,  
(11) 
Active Labour Market Policy  
ALMPt  6Yt,  
(12) 
Public Investment  
Inv gt  11Yt;  
(13) 
Output  
1
Yt
dYt
dt
 c5 log ADtYt ,
 
(14) 
where  
ADt  Ct  Inv pt  Xt  Mt  Gt;  
(15) 
Price  
  
 
 
 
1
Pt
dPt
dt
 c6 log

P t
Pt ,
 
(16) 
where  

P t  7Wt13PftS14 tLFt15 ;  
(17) 
Wage  
1
Wt
dWt
dt
 c7 log

W t
Wt ,
 
(18) 
 
 
where  

W t  8Pt16tLFt17 ;  
(19) 
Labour Demand  
1
Lt
dLt
dt
 c8 log

L t
Lt ,
 
(20) 
where  

L t  9Yt18 WtPt
19
Kt20 ALMPt21 ;  
 
(21) 
Labour Force  
1
LFt
dLFt
dt
 1;
 
(22) 
Uncovered Interest Parity Condition  
  
 
 
 
E 1
St
dSt
dt
 it  if;
 
(23) 
Capital stock  
1
Kt
dKt
dt
 Inv pt  Inv gt
Kt ;
 
(24) 
Profits  
PRt  Yt  Wt
Pt Lt;  
(25) 
and Taxes  
Tt  2Yt;  
(26) 
 
Equations (1-13) describe the components of the aggregate demand 
in real terms and their behaviour. Each component adjusts to its desired 
value with a speed of adjustment represented by the parameter  ci.   
In equation (2) real consumption is a function of real disposable 
income which is divided into its component parts: salary, unemployment 
benefits, and profits. This formalization emphasizes that earners of different 
streams of income have different consumption elasticities: very high for the 
unemployed and workers, smaller for entrepreneurs ( 2     1     3  )7. 
In equation (4), the decision to invest is influenced by the cost of 
                                                 
7The idea of different elasticity of consumption for different categories of consumers was 
already advanced by J.M. Keynes in his General Theory. It was then further developed by 
other economists among which N. Kaldor, 1971 and J. Robinson, 1961. 
For simplicity, we assumed that the populations is completely divided into three groups: 
  
 
 
 
capital as well as by the income growth rate (the typical accelerator 
component). In addition, we assume that entrepreneurs are favourably 
influenced in their investment decisions by the money transferred from the 
public sector budget to the firms under the Active Labour Market Policies ( 
7  0 ). If we think this money has to be used for training programs and/or 
takes the form of employment subsides8 then, we can assume they stimulate 
investments9. 
In equation (6) the demand for real exports is described. It depends 
on foreign income and on competitiveness, given by the ratio of internal 
prices to foreign prices. Analogously, equation (8) describes the demand for 
real imports which depends on national income and competitiveness. The 
effect of this last variable is positive on imports and negative on exports. 
Equation (9) describes the public expenditure as a sum of three 
components: public investment (state investment in infrastructures), the 
                                                                                                                            
unemployed, workers and entrepreneurs. There are not people without income. 
8One example can be the Contratti di formazione e lavoro intensively used in Italy. 
See Layard R., S. Nickel and R. Jackman, (1999), pag. 102-108. 
9We are aware of the fact that the final impact of ALMPs has not been clearly ascertained 
(see L. Calmfors, 1994; J. Kluve and C.M. Schmidt, 2002), but if we assume that the effect 
is to increase the productivity of workers and to reduce the unit cost of production, then the 
positive effect on investments is plausible. It can be argued that because of the increased 
productivity of labour, entrepreneurs would rather adopt a more labour intensive technique 
and reduce demand for capital. However, if we agree on the fact that profits positively 
influence investment, then ALMPs by increasing profits also increase investment. For an 
explanation of the theory of investment in which profits are considered a positive 
determinant, see W. Baumol, 1959 and 1962. 
In the current version of the paper the positive effect of ALMPs on profit is not explicitly 
formalized. In another version the price equation explicitly contains the work productivity 
as a growing function of the job training programs. The preliminary results of this second 
paper seem to strengthen the conclusion reached with this work. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) and the total 
amount of Unemployment Benefits (UB, per-capita benefit times the 
number of unemployed). While the first two components increase 
proportionally with the national income (equations 12 and 13), the third 
grows when either the unemployment rate or the amount of per-capita 
unemployment benefit increases (equations 10 and 11). The idea being that 
the higher is national income the higher is the expenditure capacity of the 
government for national welfare, labour policies and for state investments. 
Equation (14) tells us that the level of economic activity is demand 
driven: output adjusts to aggregate demand (15) at a rate equal to  c5  . 
Equation (16) indicates that prices adjust to their desired level  

P t   
with the adjustment speed equal to  c6 .   The desired level, as shown by 
equation (17) depends on production costs; wages and imported raw 
material or semi-product, on which a variable mark-up is applied. The mark-
up varies with the level of activity proxied by the unemployment level. The 
higher is the level of activity (and so the lower is the unemployment level), 
the higher is the producer power to set prices10 
The wage's behaviour, as described in equation (18), requires little 
explanation. Nominal wage adjusts to its desired level with the adjustment 
speed defined as  c7  . The desired level, described in equation (19), depends 
on the parameter  8   (which can be assumed to represent the minimum 
                                                 
10We know that the effect on prices of an increased level of activity is generally very low 
(see Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1999, pag. 25) and is probably negligible in those 
countries starting from very low aggregate demand. But we don't want to exclude it on a 
priori ground and in any case, neglecting the unemployment level does not change the 
qualitative results of our model. 
  
 
 
 
wage), on the price level and, inversely, on the unemployment level. 
As shown by equation (20), employment adjusts to its desired level 
with a speed of adjustment equal to c8. The desired level given by equation 
(21), contains elements of both Keynesian and neoclassical theories. Indeed, 
it depends on the output as well as on the real wage. Furthermore, there are 
two other variables influencing the demand for labour: the stock of capital 
K(t) and the transfers from the government to the enterprises through the 
Active Labour Market Policies, ALMPs(t). The reason for including the 
stock of capital is due to the fact that in the transition countries the 
accumulation process has often restarted after the fall of the planned 
systems, given that the industrial structures and the infrastructures present at 
the end of the eighties were either obsolete or specific to production of 
goods and services mainly for exports within the CMEA area11. This means 
that the production possibilities and the employment level are now 
constrained by the level reached in the rebuilding process of the physical 
capital. In brief, we can say that employment is capital constrained. The 
other component, ALMPs(t), has a doubly positive effect on demand for 
labour; Firstly, it contributes directly to the reduction of labour cost to the 
firm12. Secondly, by increasing workers' productivity13, it is more 
                                                 
11CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance), the supranational organization that 
grouped together all countries under the Soviet Union influence.  
12For example, this is the case of ALMPs that take the form of reduction of the payroll 
taxes payed by the employer if he employs workers belonging to certain groups (long-term 
unemployed, young, etc.). 
13This is the case of ALMPs that take the form of training programs. For a detailed surveys 
on the various forms of ALMPs and their effects on the labour market, see L. Calmfors, 
1994. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
convenient for entrepreneurs to switch towards more labour intensive 
production technologies. 
The unemployment level can then be obtained by applying the 
unemployment rate (described in equation 10) to the labour force. For the 
sake of simplicity, we assume that the labour force coincides with the 
population. This last variable to grow at an exogenous rate,  1  . 
Regarding equation (23), because of the country's intention to 
became a full member of the Union, it is assumed that the national monetary 
authority decides to peg the currency to the Union's currency even before to 
acquire full membership. This means that with perfect free movement of 
capital the national interest rate is not free to change, and has to be pegged 
to the one set by the Union Central Bank, thus reducing even more the 
policy instruments in the hands of the authorities. 
The last three equations are descriptive: the dynamic of the capital 
formation is given by the dynamic of the two types of investment, public 
and private (equation (24)); the tax system is assumed to be proportional 
(equation (26)); the real profits are obtained as a difference between real 
income and the total real salaries (equation (25)). 
 
3. Numerical simulation and equilibrium analysis 
Before solving the system to find the equilibrium paths and to 
analyze its properties, we need to linearize some of the equations around 
their steady state values. The linearization process being a very long and 
technical matter we refer the interested readers to the appendix, where the 
determination of the steady state of the system has also been described, 
  
 
 
 
while the steady state growth rates of all the endogenous variables are 
reported in Table 1. 
 
 
T ABLE 1
1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,11 ,13 ,15  82  93  911316 13171  143 
8  1431317111316
9  1614317111316
10  1
14  113 171116 14311316
  
 
 
3.1. Steady state analysis 
Let's now analyze the economic meaning of the steady state growth 
rate values obtained. We can see that in equilibrium, all the real variables 
grow at the same rate. The analysis of the composition of that rate of growth 
shows the strong demand-driven nature of the economy under consideration. 
The first element ( 82  ) says that the domestic economy growth 
strongly depends on the export elasticity to foreign income and on the rate 
of growth of the partner economy. The nature of the economy is stressed 
also by the second and third term of the real variables growth rate:  
93  911316 13171  143 .   Indeed, it depends positively on the 
  
 
 
 
export elasticity to the terms of trade (in absolute value) and on the rate of 
growth of foreign price. It also depends on the domestic price elasticity to 
the cost of imported raw material ( 143  ) and on the price elasticity to 
unemployment ( 1317  ). These relations all underline the fact that, given 
the importance of exports for the domestic economy, the better is their 
competitive power the faster the economy grows. Finally, the indexation 
effect  ( 1316  )14 has an impact on the growth of the economy because of 
the indirect effect on consumption through real wage. The rate of growth of 
this last variable is given by the difference between nominal wage growth 
rate and the price rate of growth. 
The indexation effect also influences the rate of growth of the 
nominal variables (price as well as wage) as we would have expected. 
Moreover domestic prices are obviously influenced by the cost of imported 
goods (being the raw material ( 143  ) and by the price elasticity to 
unemployment ( 1317  ). While the nominal wage growth rate is 
influenced by the wage elasticity to unemployment ( 17  ) and by the 
component ( 1416  ) that we can define as nominal wage elasticity to 
foreign price. In as far as the rate of growth of unemployment benefits is 
concerned, it is by construction equal to the real wage one. 
Lastly, in steady state the employment growth rate as to be the same 
as the labour force one, in order to keep constant the unemployment rate at 
                                                 
14Being  13   the elasticity of price to wage and  16   the elasticity of wage to price, we 
can consider their product as the grade of the economy's indexation. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
its equilibrium value. 
 
3.2. Comparative dynamics 
We can now proceed to a comparative dynamic analysis of the 
steady state results. Referring to the values shown in Table 1, we can see 
that the first element of the rate of growth of the real variables ( 82  ) 
indicates that the domestic economy will grow at a higher15 rate the higher 
is the export elasticity to foreign income for a given value of the foreign 
income growth rate. The same is valid for higher growth rate of foreign 
income. Very simply, the real side of the domestic economy will grow at a 
faster rate, making it possible to devote larger amounts of resources to the 
public expenditure (in all its components) and easing the restructuring 
process, the more they can export to the rest of the world. Moreover, given 
the demand driven nature of the economy, real variables growth rates will 
be higher the higher is (in absolute term) the export elasticity to the terms of 
trade and the higher is the rate of growth of foreign prices ( 93  ). 
Finally, the lower is the value of domestic price elasticity to the cost of 
imported raw materials ( 143  ), and the higher is the value of the price 
elasticity to unemployment ( 1317  ) the stronger will be the growth of the 
acceding country's economy. This shows that the more the domestic firms 
are able to contain internal price increases due to the increase in the costs of 
                                                 
15The expression a higher value of .... corresponds to a higher (or smaller)  value of..., 
means that we are comparing two different steady states: the first one in which the 
parameter under consideration has a certain value and the second one in which the same 
parameter has a different value. 
 
  
 
 
 
production (wage and row material cost) the more competitive they are on 
the international market. 
This result is in line with the reality of the EU acceding countries; 
given the limited amount of internal resources, a push to the growth process 
has to come from foreign countries through exports demand. 
The indexation effect  ( 1316  ) has a positive impact on the real 
variables given that it prevents a real wage fall that would reduce 
consumption restraining the growth of the economy. 
The indexation effect obviously influences in the same direction the 
rate of growth of the nominal variables (price as well as wage). Moreover, 
while the growth of domestic price is lower the lower is its elasticity to 
imported goods and the higher is its indirect elasticity to the level of 
economic activity ( 1317  ), the nominal wage rate of growth is smaller 
the lower is its indirect elasticity to foreign price  ( 1416  ) and the higher 
is its elasticity to unemployment ( 17  ). 
 
3.3. Equilibrium analysis 
Given the numbers of the equations involved in the model it is not 
possible to say anything on the nature of the equilibrium if we do not 
attribute values to the parameters. As we said earlier, in developing this 
model our interest was principally on the possible effect of EU accession on 
the entering countries and for this reason we decided to attribute to the 
parameters the values that have been obtained from those estimated by 
                                                                                                                            
 
  
 
 
 
Merlvede B. et al. (2003)16. More precisely, we used the average values of 
the parameters estimated for the three most representative CEECs: Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland17. 
The solution obtained shows that the linearized system is locally 
stable. The values of the characteristic roots (table 2) tell us the qualitative 
property of the equilibria: it is a stable node. Starting from sufficiently near 
the steady state, all the endogenous variables converge towards their long 
run equilibrium growth paths. 
 
T ABLE 2
1 -1.15129
2 -1.0031
3 -0.927
4 -0.89999
5 -0.86899
6 -0.611014
7 -0.264986
8 -0.02581
9 -0.0177967   
                                                 
16The model of Merlvede B. et al., differs from our model under several aspects, the most 
important being its static property. But, considering that there are few empirical studies that 
estimate parameters for the CEECs, we decided to use their estimates. The values chosen 
can be found in the appendix. 
In another work that is being carried out, we are estimating the parameter values for some 
of the CEECs. But given the difficulties in collecting all the necessary data and the 
complexity of the non-linear dynamic estimation process, the estimates are not yet 
available. 
17The relevance of these countries has been determined in terms of the size of populations 
and in terms of the percentage of their GDP with respect to the EU-15. Slovenia has the 
highest ratio of its GDP to the EU-15, but its population is very small. See Boeri et al., 
2002. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
We obtain very interesting results if we slightly change the values of 
some of the most relevant parameters. For example, by slightly increasing 
the value of  11   (the ratio of state investment to GDP from 0.2 to 0.25) we 
observe an increase in the values, in absolute terms, of some of the 
characteristic roots (table 3). Analogously, the same happens if we increase 
the value of  6  (the ratio of government spending on Active Labour 
Market Policies to GDP from 0.005 to 0.0075, table 4) Technically, this 
means that a change in these parameters does not change the qualitative 
nature of the equilibria and only increases the velocity at which the 
equilibrium growth path is approached. 
 
T ABLE 3
1 -1.15164
2 -1.0031
3 -0.927
4 -0.900002
5 -0.86899
6 -0.611014
7 -0.264986
8 -0.0752268
9 -0.021642
T ABLE 4
1 -1.1514
2 -1.0031
3 -0.927
4 -0.900003
5 -0.86899
6 -0.611014
7 -0.264986
8 -0.09851
9 -0.01772   
As we know, these parameters are the ones that represent the 
expenditure policy of the government. But having to respect the budget 
constraints imposed on the acceding countries by having to respect the 
  
 
 
 
Copenhagen Criteria, the policy authority cannot choose the amount of 
public expenditure that would best satisfy their needs. This clearly shows 
that if the government of the applicant countries could use their fiscal policy 
more freely, the transition process could be faster. This aspect is even more 
important if we remember that entering the Union means the loss of the 
other tools that the policy authority can use to stimulate their economy. 
Indeed, they lose both the use of the exchange rate to stimulate exports and 
the interest rate to stimulate investment. 
There is one aspect of the enlargement which can have a positive 
effect in the short term for the new entrant country. It is the possibility to 
access the Structural and Cohesion funds. These funds would allow the 
government of the interested country to increase state investment in 
infrastructures (or in welfare programs, or in labour market policies, and so 
on), without worsening the public deficit18. However, if in the redistribution 
process of these funds, the incumbent countries are not prepared to give up a 
big share of their transfer from the Union, then the amount of money the 
CEECs receive might not be enough to counterbalance the constraining 
effect of having to respect the Maastricht Criteria. 
We can therefore conclude that adoption of European Union 
Membership is not necessary the best move for the CEECs, at least in the 
short term. The results strongly depend on the Social Policy and on the 
                                                 
18Structural Fund and Cohesion Fund support always involves part-financing. That means 
that if prior to acquiring EU membership the government of one of the CEECs can make an 
investment for 100 million , becoming a member of EU will make possible for the same 
government to make an investment for 200 million , the difference being supplied by the 
European Union. 
 
  
 
 
 
Cohesion Policy that will be adopted by the Union. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We built a dynamic continuous time model to analyze the effects on 
the CEECs of the enlargement of the European Union towards the east. The 
model is characterized by many Keynesian features. It is a demand driven 
economy in which employment depends on the level of the aggregate 
demand but also on the existence of capital. A large role is played by the 
public expenditure which directly helps the capital accumulation process by 
spending in public investment and by the transfers to firms through Active 
Labour Market Policies. But it also influences indirectly the accumulation 
process through welfare programs. Sustaining the consumption level with 
unemployment benefits, it increases the aggregate demand and given how 
expectations are formed, it also influences the desired rate of capital 
accumulation. 
Having to respect the Maastricht criteria constrains public 
expenditure and the taxation burden is also quite heavy. The different 
components of public expenditure (welfare and investment) influence each 
other. In the short term, the more the governments spend on welfare 
(unemployment benefits and ALMPs) the less they can spend for investment 
and vice versa. Moreover they cannot reduce taxation because the employed 
population is not large enough and therefore the tax base is small. The 
choice is not only between the different components of public expenditure, 
but also between lower taxes but a smaller welfare system or a larger 
                                                                                                                            
 
  
 
 
 
welfare system with consequently higher taxation. The different effects on 
the income multiplier of these policies have to be considered when making a 
choice but without neglecting the internal social conditions. 
In conclusion, even if it is true that becoming a member of the EU 
will give the CEECs the opportunity of receiving Structural and Cohesion 
Funds, these might not be enough to overcome the reduction in the 
accumulation process caused by the obligatory respecting of the Maastricht 
Criteria, and therefore in the short run the costs of becoming EU members 
might outweigh the benefits. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A. Derivation of the Steady State 
In order to linearize equations (9) and (15) we have to find the 
steady state value of the variables. To this end we apply the undetermined 
coefficients method19. In as far as the exogenous variables are concerned we 
assume that: 
 
 LF  LF0e
1t, Yf  Yf0e2t, Pf  Pf0e3t,   and  
i  if  if0  i0 ,   
                                                 
19See Gandolfo G., 1998, pp. 158 and 266-68. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 S  S0 .   
 
For the endogenous variables, we let 
 
C  C0e1t, Inv p  Inv p0e2t, Inv g  Inv g0e3t,
X  X0e4t, M  M0e5t, G  G0e6t,
Y  Y0e7t, P  P0e8t, W  W0e9t,
L  L0e10t, K  K0e11t,   0 ,
ALMP  ALMP0e13t, UB  UB0e14t, PR  PR0e15t.
 
where the  s   and variables with 0 as a subscript are the undetermined 
coefficients. By substituting in equations (1) and (25) and using the 
lowercase variables to indicate the natural logarithm of the correspondent 
uppercase variable, we have 
 
1  c11  1 9  8  10 t  log1  2   w0  p0  l0 
 2 ub10  lf0  0  14  1 t
3 pr0  15 t  log1  2   c0  1 t;  
 
(27) 
 2  c2 3  5 i0  67 t  7almp0  713 t  inv p0  2 t;   
(28)  
  
 
 
 
Inv g0e3t  11Y0e7t;  
 (29) 
4  c34  8yf0  2 t  9 8  3 t  p0  pf0  s0   x 0  4 t;
 
 (30) 
5  c45  10y0  7 t  11 8  3 t  p0  pf0  s0   m0  5 t;
 
 (31) 
G0e6t  UB0e14tLF0e1t  Le10t   ALMP0e13t  Inv g0e3t;   
 (32) 
7  c5 logC0e1t  Inv p0e2t  X0e4t  M0e5t  G0 e6t   y0  7 t;
 
 (33) 
8  c6 7  13w0  139 t  14pf0  s0  15lf0  1 t  0
 143 t  p0  8 t;  
 
 (34) 
9  c7 8  16p0  168 t  17lf0  1 t  0  w0  9 t;   
 (35) 
10  c8 9  18y0  187 t  19w0  p0   199  8 t
 20k o  2011 t  21almp0  2113 t  l0  10 t;   
 (36) 
  
 
 
 
11  Inv p0e
2t  Inv g0e3t 
K0e11t
;
 
 (37) 
0  LF0e
1t  L0e10t 
LF0e1t
;
 
(38)  
ALMP0e13t  6Y0e7t;  
 (39) 
UB0e14t  10 W0P0 e
98 t;
 
 (40) 
PR0e15t  Y0e7t  W0P0 L0e
9810 t;
 
(41) 
 Equations (27)-(41) are identically satisfied if, and only if the 
following two sets of equations are satisfied: 
Set 1  
19  8  10   214  1   315  1  0   
(42) 
67  713  2  0  
(43) 
7  3  0  
  
 
 
 
(44) 
82  98  3   4  0  
(45) 
107  118  3   5  0  
(46) 
6  1410  141  13  3  
(47) 
1  2  4  5  6  7  
(48) 
 
139  143  151  8  0  
(49) 
 
168  171  9  0  
(50) 
187  199  8   2011  1213  10  0   
(51) 
11  2  3  
(52) 
1  10  0  
  
 
 
 
(53) 
13  7  
(54) 
14  9  8  
(55) 
15  7  10  
(56) 
Set 2  
logC0  c0  1  1 log1  2   w0  p0  l0   2ub0  lf0  0
 3 pr0  log1  2 
 
(57) 
logInv p0  inv p0  3  5 i0  7almp0   
(58) 
Inv g0  11Y0  
(59) 
logX0  x 0  4  8yf0  9p0  pf0  s0    
(60) 
logMo  m0  5  10y0  11p0  pf0  s0    
(61) 
  
 
 
 
G0  UB0LF0  L0   ALMP0  Inv g0  
(62) 
logY0  y0  logC0  Inv p0  X0  M0  G0    
(63) 
logP0  p0  7  13w0  14pf0  s0  15lf0  0   
(64) 
logW0  w0  8  16p0  17lf0  0   
(65) 
logL0  l0  9  18y0  19w0  p0   20k 0  21almp0   
(66) 
K0  Inv p0  Inv g0  
(67) 
0  1  L0LF0  
(68) 
ALMP0  6Y0  
(69) 
UB0  10 W0P0  
(70) 
 
  
 
 
 
PR0  Y0  L0 W0P0  
(71) 
By solving Set 1 we obtain the values of the steady state growth 
rates of the endogenous variables, while the solution of Set 2 gives us the 
initial values of the steady state paths of the endogenous variables. For our 
purposes the relevant values are the steady state growth rates, hence we 
shall concentrate on these. 
From equations (44) and (48) we demonstrate that the growth rate of 
income, real consumption, public investment, private investment, export, 
import and public expenditure (all in real terms), has to be the same in 
steady state. 
From equation (45) and (46) we can see that in order to be 
identically verified the rate of growth of domestic price has to be the same 
as its foreign correspondent. Moreover, exports (and hence all the other 
variables), grow at a rate that, given the value of elasticity  8 ,   depends on 
the rate of growth of world output. 
Obviously, the rate of growth of the physical capital is equal to the 
sum of public and private investment growth rates as confirmed by equation 
(52). Similarly, as equation (53) shows, in steady state the employment rate 
of growth has to be equal to the labour force rate of growth, so that 
unemployment rate of growth is null. Equations (54) and (55) tell us that in 
the steady state, the rate of growth of the different categories of public 
expenditures (Active Labour Market Policy and Unemployment Benefit) 
has to be equal to the rate of growth of real income. Finally, given the 
  
 
 
 
division of the gross national income into two categories, real salaries and 
real profits, equation (56) states that the three variables have to grow at the 
same rate. The growth rate values so obtained are reported in Table 1 in the 
text. 
 
B. Linearization about the steady state 
At this point we build new variables as logarithmic deviations of the 
original variables from their steady state values. We obtain a system of non-
linear autonomous differential equations. This makes possible to study the 
local stability of the original system trough the study of its linearized 
counterpart20. The new variables are: 
 
x 1
 
= log 
C
C0e1t  
   
x 2
 
= 
log 
Invp
Invp0e2t  
   
x 3
 
= 
log 
Invg
Invg0e3t  
   
x 4
 
= log 
X
X0e4t  
   
x 5
 
= log 
M
M0e5t  
   
                                                 
20See G. Gandolfo, 1981, pp. 25 -29, 1997, Chap. 21,  pp. 333-335 and pp. 360-363. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
x 6
 
= log 
G
G0e6t  
   
x 7
 
= log 
Y
Y0e71t  
   
 
x 8
 
= log 
P
P0e8t  
   
x 9
 
= log 
W
W0e9t  
   
x 10
 
= log 
L
L0e10t  
   
x 11
 
= log 
K
K0e11t  
   
x 12
 
=   0  
   
x 13
 
= log 
ALMP
ALMP0e13t  
   
x 14
 
= log 
UB
UB0e14t  
   
x 15
 
= log 
PR
PR0e15t  
 
At this point we can rewrite the original system in terms of the new 
variables:  
  
 
 
 
Dx 1  c1 1x 9  x 8  x 10   2x 14  x 12  3x 15  x 1    
 (72) 
Dx 2  c26Dx 6  7x 13  x 2  
 (73) 
x 3  x 7  
 (74) 
Dx 4  c39x 8  x 4  
 (75) 
Dx 5  c410x 6  11x 8  x 5  
 (76) 
x 6  ALMP0G0 x 13 
Inv g0
G0
x 3
 
 (77) 
Dx 7  c5 C0Y0 x 1  x 7  
Inv p0
Y0
x 2  x 7  
X0
Y0
x 4  x 7   M0Y0 x 5  x 7  
G0
Y0
x 6  x 7 
 
 
 (78) 
 
Dx 8  c613x 9  x 8   
 (79) 
  
 
 
 
Dx 9  c716x 8  x 9   
 (80) 
Dx 10  c818x 6  19x 9  19x 8  20x 11  21x 13  x 10   
 (81) 
Dx 11  11  11
Inv p0
K0
x 2  Inv g0K0 x 3 
Inv p0  Inv g0
K0
x 11  
 
 (82) 
x 12  0  
 (83) 
x 13  x 7  
 (84) 
x 14  x 9  x 8  
 (85) 
x 15  Y0
Y0  W0P0 L0
x 7 
W0
P0
L0
Y0  W0P0 L0
x 9  x 8  x 10   
 
(86) 
 The equations (77), (78), (82) and (86), are obtained after applying 
the following log- linearization process: 
Consider equation (9) of the text. Consider then the log deviations of  
Gt   from its equilibrium growth path  
  
 
 
 
x 6  log UBtLFt  ALMPt  Inv g0tG0e6t  
 It can be re-written as  
 log
UBt
UB 0e14t
UB0e14t  0  LFtLF0e1t LF0e
1t
G0e6t

log
ALMPt
ALMP 0e13t
ALMP0e13t  InvgtInvg0e3t Inv g0e3t
G0e6t
.
 
 Recalling from the solution for the steady state growth rate that  
6  13  14  3 and   0 ,  
we can rewrite the last equation as  
x 6  log e
x13 ALMP0  ex3 Inv g0
G0  
 By applying the linearization formula given in Gandolfo (1981, p. 
98) we obtain equation (77). 
Consider now equation (14) of the text and rewrite it as  
D logYt  c5 CtYt 
Inv pt
Yt 
Xt
Yt 
Mt
Yt 
G
Yt   
 By performing the same operation on the corresponding steady state 
value and subtracting it from the former we obtain  
  
 
 
 
Dx 7  C0e
1t
Y0e7t
Ct/C0e1t
Yt/Y0e7t  1 
Inv p0e2t
Y0e7t
Inv pt/Inv p0e2t
Yt/Y0e7t  1
 X0e4t
Y0e7t
Xt/X0e4t
Yt/Y0e7t  1 
M0e5t
Y0e7t
Mt/M0e5t
Yt/Y0e7t  1 
G0e6t
Y0e7t
Gt/G0e6t
Yt/Y0e7t  1 .
 
 Recalling from (48) that  1  2  4  5  6  7 ,    
Dx 7  c5 C0Y0 e
x1x7  Inv p0Y0 e
x2x7  X0Y0 e
x4x7  M0Y0 e
x5x7  G0Y0 e
x6x7
 
which gives us equation (78)  
Dx 7  c5 C0Y0 x 1  x 7  
Inv p0
Y0
x 2  x 7   X0Y0 x 4  x 7  
M0
Y0
x 5  x 7 
 G0Y0 x 6  x 7  .
 
 
We now apply the same procedure to equation (24) of the text to 
obtain equation (82). Taking the original equation (24) and its 
corresponding steady state value and subtracting the later from the former, 
we obtain  
Dx 11  Inv gK 
Inv p
K  
Inv g0e3t
K0e11t
 Inv p0e
2t
K0e11t

 
which after some manipulation can be written  
  
 
 
 
Dx 11  Inv g0e
3t
K0e11t

Invgt
Invg0e3t
Kt
K0e11t
 1  Inv p0e
2t
K0e11t

Invpt
Invp0e2t
Kt
K0e11t
 1.
 
 Remembering that  
11  2  3  
we have  
Dx 11  e23  Inv g0K0 e
x3x11  1  Inv p0K0 e
x2x11  1 .
 
 Given that  
exixj  1  x i  x j  
we can rewrite the last equation as  
Dx 11  11  2  3
Inv g0
K0
x 3  x 11  Inv p0K0 x 2  x 11  
from which we obtain equation (82). 
Finally equation (86) is obtained applying a similar procedure to the 
equation (25). Taking the logarithm of equation (25) and of its 
correspondent steady state value (equation 41). Subtract the later from the 
former and obtain  
x 15  log
Yt  WtPt Lt
Y0e7t  W0P0 L0e9810 t
,
 
 which can be rewritten as  
  
 
 
 
x 15  log
Y0e7t YtY0e7t 
W0e9t
P0e8t
Wt/W0e9t
Pt/P0e8t L0e
10t Lt
L0e10t
Y0e7t  W0P0 L0e9810 t
.
 
 Given that 
 
7  9  8  10  
we can write  
x 15  log
Y0ex7  W0P 0 L0ex9x8x10
Y0  W0P0 L0

logY0ex7  W0P0 L0e
x9x8x10  logY0  W0P0 L0.   
(87) 
Assuming  Y0ex7   as a single variable, say  x   and  
W0
P0
L0ex9x8x10  
as another single variable, say  y  , we can apply formula (I.1) given in 
Gandolfo (1981, p. 98) to the first logarithm and obtain 
 
logY0ex7  W0P0 L0ex9x8x10 
logY0ex70  W0P0 L0ex9
0x80x100   1
Y0ex7
0 W0P0 L0e
x90x80x100 
Y0ex70 log Y0ex7
Y0ex7
0    W0P0 L0ex9
0x80x100  log
W0
P0
L0e x9x8x10
W0
P0
L0e x9
0x80x100 
 .
 
  
 
 
 
 
Because by definition 
 
x 70  x 90  x 80  x 100  0,  
it follows that 
 
logY0ex7  W0P0 L0ex9x8x10 
logY0  W0P0 L0  1Y0 W0P0 L0
Y0x 7  W0P0 L0x 9  x 8  x 10.
 
 
By substituting this last equation into equation (87), we obtain  
x 15  log
Y0ex7  W0P0 L0ex9x8x10
Y0  W0P0 L0

Y0
Y0  W0P0 L0
x 7 
W0
P 0
L0
Y0  W0P0 L0
x 9  x 8  x 10 ,
 
which corresponds to equation (86). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
C. Parameter's values 
 
Elasticity Constants Speed of adjustment  
   
 1  0.4    1  0.8   c 1  1.150  
 2  0.6    2  0.3   c 2  1.003  
 3  0.3    3  0.4   c 3  0.927  
 4  0   4  1.9   c 4  0.869  
 5  0.1125   5  0.2   c 5  0.08  
 6  1.2    6  0.005  c 6  0.493  
 7  0.1    7  1.2   c 7  0.383  
 8  0.2536   8  0.7  c 8  0.9   
 9  0.401   9  0.7    
 10  0.1668   10  0.5   Rate of growth of the 
 11  0.3093   11  0.2    exogenous variables 
 12  0   2  0.35   1  0.01   
 13  0.1411    2  0.025  
 14  0.1289    3  0.02   
 15  0    
 16  0.4402    
 17  0.00015    
 18  0.0509    
  
 
 
 
 19  0.0291    
 20  0.002    
 21  0.002    
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